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ABSTRACT

One of the important determinants of fertility is the value of children as
perceived by parents.

This paper estimates gender and age specific value of

children using a dynamic programming model.

The underlying hypothesis is that

the observed fertility outcomes for any couple are the solutions to their life
cycle optimization problem.

Findings from Korean data indicate that, compared

to daughters, sons impose higher costs at young ages but yields greater
benefits at mature ages.

Both the early costs and later benefits increase

with parental education.

Also, using the estimated parameters, simulations

are performed to show the effect of the screening test of fetal gender on
fertility, gender-specific abortion and the sex ratio.

1. Introduction

The value (costs and benefits) of children is one of the important determi
nants of parental fertility behavior and related household decisions, such as
women's labor force participation.

The value is expected to depend upon the

child's age, sex, birth order, parental characteristics (such as, age of
parents), household income, and socio-economic environment.

However, the

researchers face a number of questions during investigation of this issue,
such as, what is the value of children to parents? and how is it measured?
The value of children may be economic or non-economic in nature.

How can one

evaluate non-economic costs and benefits relative to economic ones?

The true

value of children can only be obtained after a proper aggregation of these two
different types of value.
A few previous studies on value of children were from anthropological
and demographic perspectives (see, for example, Caldwell, 1982 and 1983), or
they were based on qualitative and attitudinal survey data. 1

There are also

some time-use studies and a few studies which attempt to compute the direct
economic costs and benefits of children. 2

However, there is little consensus

on the net value of children even in terms of direct economic costs and
benefits.

A most agreed upon conclusion may be that children's most signifi

cant economic contributions might be old age support and insurance against
extreme adversity, especially in societies where other forms of insurance or

Arnold et. al. (1975), Bulatao (1981), Fawcett (1983), and Arnold and
Kuo (1984), and Vlassoff (1990).
1 See

Mueller(l976), Cain (1977, 1981), Nag et al. (1978) and Lindert (1980)
for developing countries and Lindert (1978), Espenshade (1984) and Robinson
(1985) for U.S.
2 See

1

alternative investment opportunities are not available.
This paper does not measure the value of children qualitatively or by
time-use, nor through direct economic costs and benefits.

Instead, this

analysis estimates gender-age specific value of children from observed
fertility outcomes using a dynamic programming model.
Fertility decision-making can be viewed as stochastic dynamic control
problems where the outcomes take integer values. 3

Uncertainty exists in many

biological and socio-economic aspects, such as, fecundability, mortality,
child's gender prior to birth, and children's as well as own financial condi
tions in future.

Essentially, fertility decisions involve not only the number

but also the timing and spacing of children.

Consider that parents' primary

concern is to secure old age support, which can be accomplished only by
transfers from sons.

Parents without a son are likely to put more efforts

into having another child, other things being the same.

Furthermore, parents

would try to time their childbearing so that the period of transfers from
children coincide with own old age, a definite phase of low income.

The

dynamic model employed in this p~per integrates the overlapping children's,
and parent's life cycles.
Recently, there has been a growing literature on this issue.

Heckman

and Willis (1976) developed a pioneering stochastic dynamic model of fertility
in which parents choose a monthly conception probability in a discrete time
framework.

A study by Wolpin (1984) developed a pioneering work of an

estimable stochastic dynamic model.

In particular, he addresses the dynamic

implications of the uncertain child

mortality on fertility.

Hotz and Miller

See Heckman and Willis (1976), Wolpin (1984), Rosenzweig and Schultz
(1985), Newman (1988), Montgomery (1988), Hotz and Miller (1988), and David and
Mroz (1989).
3

2

(1988) examine fertility and female labor supply over the life cycle in a
simultaneous decision framework.

They show, using U.S. data, that the

material costs of children do not vary much with age while the time costs
decrease with child's age.
Rust (1987,1989) developed an estimation framework of a structural
dynamic model which is derived directly from the optimization problem.
Applying Rust's dynamic algorithm, Montgomery (1988) estimated a structural
dynamic model of contraceptive use.

Montgomery focused on imperfect fertility

control, and a revealed-preference estimation of desired family sizes.
This paper builds on Wolpin (1984) and Hotz and Miller (1988), and
adopts Rust's (1989) framework to estimations.

While previous researches have

used dynamic models to explain the number of children ever born, desired
probability of a birth, or the effect of mortality on fertility, this research
focuses on estimating the costs and benefits of children.

By estimating the

relative costs (and benefits) of boys to girls by age, it attempts to uncover
the causes, types, and the extent of parental gender preferences of children
and their effect on fertility.

Furthermore, using the estimated parameters,

it shows the impact of the medical determination of fetal gender on fertility
and sex ratio.
The subsequent exercise uses Korean data to estimate the value of
children, which indicate that, compared to daughters, sons impose higher costs
at young ages but yield greater benefits at mature ages.
later benefits increase with parental education.

The early costs and

Furthermore, simulations in

this research suggest that, given the estimated age-sex specific value of
children, a decrease in the costs of screening test will drastically increase
the male birth ratio, which is supported by evidence from Korean vital
3

statistics (National Bureau of Statistica, Korea, 1990).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.

Section 2 describes a

dynamic model of household fertility choice and the estimation strategy.
data is discussed in section 3.

The

The estimation results and the sensitivity

test of the model are in section 4.

In the following section, the effects of

the screening test of fetal gender on fertility pattern and sex ratios are
simulated using the parameter estimates from the section 4.

The last section

summarizes the findings and discusses possible extensions.

2. A stochastic Dynamic Model of Fertility

A couple's lifetime after marriage is divided into a series of periods.
Denote t=l as the first fertile period, r the last fertile period, and T the
last living period.

The couple's problem is to choose a contraceptive method

(or a combination of multiple methods) and the extent of its use at each
fertile period to maximize lifetime utility (utility is accrued only while one
is alive) under a budget and a biological constraint.
For analytical simplicity the model contains several assumptions.
First, it is assumed that there is no savings or dissavings. 4

It is further

assumed that the costs and benefits of children can be evaluated as money
equivalents, that is, children and consumption are perfect substitutes.

Under

these assumptions, one of the primary reasons of having children is that they
will provide parents with consumption (support) when the parents' income is
reduced or eliminated.

4

The inclusion of capital market in the model will make the model too
complicated to be estimable.
4

Second, it is assumed that there is no uncertainty in own (T) mortality,
the onset of sterility (r), lifetime income schedule, and perceived child
value schedule.
tractable.
parents. 5

These assumptions are made to keep the model empirically

Furthermore, it is assumed that children always survive their
This simplifies the model by eliminating stochastic variations

regarding child mortality. 6
Third, parents can control their childbearing perfectly without incur
ring any costs.

The extension to the imperfect control regime is theoretical

7
ly straightforward , but it involves major complications empirically.

Finally, the decision on the timing of marriage and marital dissolution
as a consideration of fertility choice is not included in the model.

Similar

ly, the simultaneous feature of other household decisions made along with
fertility, such as labor force participation and expenditures on children, is
not considered in this paper. 8

2-1. Parental Optimization Problem
assumption is less problematic in countries where the infant mortality
rate is low.
5 This

model would be significantly more complicated to estimate if any of T,
r, or child mortality were treated as a random variable.
6 The

This is particularly true if data are not available on the use of
contraceptive use since the choice is not observed. Even when the choices of
contraceptive method (for the entire previous fertile periods) are observed, it
still is difficult to apply to estimation. The reason is because the choice set
includes all the available contraceptive methods and the implied size of the
state space exceeds easily the practical limit. For example, Montgomery (1988)
used four choices of contraceptive method and Hotz and Miller (1988) estimate two
levels of conception probability.
7

(1984), Rosenzweig and Schultz (1985) and Hotz and Miller (1988)
discuss models which feature a simultaneous decision-making of fertility and
labor force participation. See Becker and Lewis (1973) and Willis (1973) for the
discussion of the interaction between quality and quantity of children, and
Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman (1982, 1986) for a model of the differential
expenditure on children according to gender.
8Moffitt

5

The couple's utility function is assumed to be intertemporally additive, of
identical form at all periods, and characterized by a constant rate of time
preference.

The control variable dt takes the value of either O (not to have

a child) or 1 (to have a child) at each t for t=l, ...

,T.

The couple's utility

The amount of consumption at period tis the

depends only on own consumption.

income at t plus the money-equivalent value of children9 during the period.
The value of a k-period old boy (girl) at time tis denoted as mkt(fkt), which
It is assumed to depend on the child's

may be either positive or negative.
age and gender. 10

It is also assumed that the couple may have at most one

child per period.
At time t, the couple's problem is to maximize
T

Et

L

(1)

ok-t U(xk)

k=t

where Et is an expectation operator at time t,

o a discount factor, U a

utility function, and the consumption amount of a composite good xis
t-1

Xt, =

Yt +

L

(2)

(bk+lm;_k-1 + gk+lf;_k-1)

k=O

where Yt denotes the couple's income at t, and bt(gt) takes a value of one if
the couple has a male (female) birth at t and zero otherwise.
The state facing a couple at any time is determined by the choices made

should be viewed as including noneconomic values (or disvalues)
converted to monetary terms as well as economic ones. However, I abstract from
the issue of aggregating different types of values.
9 It

10 Later,

I estimate the model separately according
socio-economic status, and therefore allow the net value
However, I
according to parental socioeconomic status.
variation by the age of parents, birth order of children,
Espenshade (1984) shows that there is a large variation
children depending on the parent's status.
6

to the parent's
of children vary
do not allow the
or calendar time.
in expenditure on

Let~ denote the probability

during the previous periods and their outcomes.

When dt is chosen at period t, the state

of any birth to be a male child.

facing the couple is a new-born boy with a probability of ~dt, a new-born girl
with a probability of (1-~)dt, and no birth with a probability of 1-dt, in
addition to the existing children at the beginning of the period.
The optimal choices for the entire fertile life cycle can be determined
Let b(t) represent {bk}k=lt-l the se

by the method of backwards recursion.

and g(t) for the female birth event.

quence of a male birth event up to t-1

Thus, b(t) and g(t) represent the state faced by a couple at the start of
period t.
s(t)

=

for

{ s 1 , s 2 , ... ,st-l}

(3)

s = b, g

Similarly, let m(t) and f(t) represent vectors of age-specific values of boys
and girls as perceived by parents at t.
c(t)

=

{

ctt-1

•

ctt-2

• • • • •

ct1 } for c

= m, f

(4)

Therefore, the vector multiplication, b(t)m(t), denotes the net value of
existing boys at time t, and g(t)f(t) for girls.
The post-childbearing value function is defined as discounted expected
utility during the sterile periods (r+l, ... T),

and is written as

T

V.,-+ 1 (b(r+l),

g(r+l))

=

L

c5k-.,-- 1 (Yk + b(r+l)m(k) + g(r+l)f(k))

(S)

k=.,-+1

At the last fertile period (r), given the income and child's value
schedule for the current and future periods

{Yt, m(t), f(t) }t=.,.t=T, the dis

counted expected utility if d.,. is chosen is as in equation 6.
Define the value function at the period r as in equation 7.
It can be shown that a unique solution to the above equation exists, and the
7

EUt = d.,.[7rU(Y.,. + b(T)m('T') + g(T)f('T') + mo)
+ ( 1-11") U (y.,. + b ( 1') m(,,.) + g (,,.) f (,,.) + £ 0)
+ 7rV.,.+1(b(1'), g(T), b.,.=l) + (l-7r)V.,.+1(b(1'), g(T), g.,.=l)]
+ (1-d.,.) [U(Y.,. + b(T)m(T) + g(T)f(T))
+ v.,.+ 1 Cb(,,.), g(,,.))l

V.,. ( b (,,.) , g (,,.) ) =

max

(6)

EU.,. ( d.,. I b (,,.) , g (,,.) )

(7)

d.,.={O,ll

optimal choice is determined for each possible state at

1'.

Now, going one

period backwards, we solve the problem for the second to last fertile period.
Likewise, by a successive recursion, we can solve for the couple's state
contingent optimal fertility problem over their entire fertile periods.
2-2. Statistical Model
A couple decides on childbearing sequentially at each fertile period under the
uncertainties in the sex of unborn children.

For researchers, an additional

stochastic element exists in the unobserved error terms of the utility
function, et.

Thus the single period utility associated with decision dt at

period t given (b(t),g(t),et) is
(8)

The unobserved term et is assumed to be choice specific and additive to the
systematic part of utility.

The value of et(dt) can be interpreted as an

unobserved transitory utility costs of choosing dt.

Given the stochastic

evolution of the state embodied by the transition probability and the choices
made, the couple chooses a sequence of decision rules {dt} to maximize the
discounted expected utility over their lifetime.

The decision rule is

determined from Bellman's equation

Note that the expectation in the last term is respect to both the randomness
8

in the sex of the child(~) and the distribution of et.
If et are identically and independently distributed bivariate extreme
value errors, the probability of choice dt follows binary logit formula.
Pr (dt

I

b(t), g(t)) =

exp [U(dt I b(t),g(t)) + oEVt+1<dt I b(t),g(t))]
Y' exp [U(dt I (b(t),g(t)) + oEVt+1<dt I b(t),g(t))]

(10)

dt~,ll

The sample likelihood then is
I

'Ti

:£ :£

Pr(d;

I

b 1 (t), g 1 (t))

(11)

isl t=s1

where I is the number of women in the sample, and si and ri
marriage and the age at the survey of woman i.

are the age at

Using an iterative method we

can obtain consistent estimates which maximize the sample likelihood.

2-3. Empirical Specifications
The costs and benefits of children are assumed to depend on sex and age, but
not on the birth order or age of parents. 11

However, by estimating the model

separately for each subgroup, the model allows the value of children to vary
according to parent's socio-economic status.

The subgroups are formed

according to the woman's age at survey, age at marriage, education level and
labor force participation status.

For the purpose of estimation it is assumed

that the net monthly value of children are constant in four age groups for
each sex: age Oto 10, 11 to 20, 21 to 30, and 31 to 50. 12

The estimates

should be interpreted as money equivalents of an average monthly net value of
11However, the utility value of children even of the same sex and age could
differ according to parental ages due to the different income levels.
12A specification which divides the child's age more finely would be
desirable to obtain more accurate estimates, but it complicates the computation
beyond the limit. The finer specification is assigned for future work.
9

a child during the interval.

The utility function is assumed to take a

logarithmic form, 13 and the discount factor per period is assumed to be
0.95. 14

The objective function then is
T

Et

LO. 95k-t Log(xk)

(12)

k=t

where xis defined as previously.
Since the dynamic problem proposed in this paper (as in most other
discrete choice dynamic models) can only be solved numerically by backwards
induction method, the estimation involves a burdensome computation.

For

computational tractability, a seven decision-period model is used here.

Seven

periods with two years of duration per period give 14 fertile years after
marriage.
The model is identified by the variations in income profile, the sex and
age composition of children at each period, and the non-linearity embedded

in

the utility function and the multi-period structure of the model.

3. Data

The data are drawn from a two percent subsample of 1980 Korean Population and
Housing Census which was conducted by National Bureau of Statistics (Korea).
The Census is organized as a household survey.

The observation for each

13A logarithmic form of utility function emphasizes risk aversion of parents
and the gains from a balanced consumption intertemporally.

14 The attempt to estimate the discount rate has failed.
However, other
values of discount rates (e.g. 0. 9 and 1. 0) gave qualitatively similar estimation
results.

10

household member is given in the order of household head, spouse, children and
others.

My working sample includes once and currently married woman.

We

observe the couple's age, age at marriage, education level, place of resi
dence, work status, occupation, and children's age and sex.
A woman's life after marriage is divided into two year periods among
15
which first seven periods (14 years) are assumed to be fertile.

Only a few

cases were detected in which a woman had a birth later than the decision
periods under the seven-period framework.

In those cases a birth is moved to

the last fertile period in which there is no birth.

The couple is assumed to

live 50 years after the marriage.
Unfortunately, the Census did not gather information on wages or income.
The husband's income profile is constructed by matching his age and occupation
to the average monthly wage for the same age and occupation reported in the
Monthly Wage Survey (1980, Department of Labor, Republic of Korea).

The

income is assumed to increase by 5% each year until the twenty-second year,
then decrease by 10% each year thereafter.

The income during the last ten

living years is assumed to be one tenth of the peak income.

This arbitrary

assumption on income profile is maintained due to the lack of data.

Since the

income profile is the main identifying variable of the model, inexactly
predicted income profiles may yield incorrect estimates.

A test is performed

to see the sensitivity of the model by estimating the model with different
income profiles, in particular, with different assumptions on old-age income.
The model is estimated separately of each subsample which is divided
were 23, 18 and 15 periods with more than one birth among women in
primary, high school, and college education group, respectively. In those cases
the birth is moved to the previous period in which there is no birth. If there
is no previous period without a birth, then a birth is moved to the next period
in which there is no birth.
15There

11

according to individual's biological and socio-economic conditions.
is to make each subsample more homogeneous.

The idea

To begin, I select women who are

residing in Seoul and currently not working. 16

The ages at marriage of the

17
selected women are between 23 and 26, and current age between 35 and 40.

Due to the lack of information about the deceased children, I selected only
women whose number of children ever born equals the number of existing
children.

I further select only women with at least one child. 18

Three subsamples are formed according to woman's education level:
primary or lower, high school, and college or higher.
for each group separately.

I estimate the model

Total periods (women) observed are 1096 (179),

1198 (200), and 1161 (196) for primary, high-school, and college education
group respectively.

Table la-lb report the averages of the period-specific

fertility rates, age at the beginning of each fertile period, and monthly
income in 1000 Korean currency (won) for the whole lifetime.
(Table 1)
The fertility rate is highest in the first and second period and then
decreases rapidly.

However, after the third period the rate of decline is

greater among better educated women than less educated women.

Better educated

women are more likely to stop childbearing early than less educated women even

is imposed due to the problem of computing the wages for the whole
life cycle for women. It is less problematic for men since they are more likely
to work without interruption until they retire.
16This

the sample under study the median age at marriage is 25 suggesting
fertility is complete at age 39, which is true for more than 95% of women in
Korea; 4.4%, 2.7%, and 2.6% of total births are from women older than 39 in 1970,
1975, and 1980, respectively (Korean Population and Housing Census).
17 For

is imposed to exclude innately sterile women, but this will also
exclude those who have no children by their intention. However, it is believed
that there are only very few couples who desire no children.
18This

12

after controlling for age.
Another distinguished feature in observed fertility pattern among the
sample of Korean women is the differential parity progression rate according
to the sex composition of existing children.
(Table 2)
For example, at parity two, the probability to have another child among women
whose first two children were girls is twice larger than among those who had
two boys at their first two births.

The similar pattern is present among
The

higher parities as well (see Ahn, 1990 for more lengthy discussions).

differential parity progression pattern by sex composition of children will
help identify the model to estimate the sex-specific value of children.

4. Estimation Results

Table 3 shows that the value of children varies substantially according to the
child's gender and age, and the education level of parents.

The estimates

should be interpreted as overall values, non-monetary as well as monetary.
(Table 3)
The estimation results can be summarized by several notable aspects.

First,

young children impose net costs while mature children yield net benefits, and
both costs of young children and benefits from mature children are larger for
boys than girls.

College educated women place greater net value on children

of age Oto 10 than less educated women do.

It then must be the case that the

positive net value as an economic one.
non-economic value is dominating

It is hard to interpret this

the economic costs.

However, it is not

clear why it should not be the case among the less educated women.

13

Second, although in all education groups children impose highest costs
during the age between 11 to 30 and yield net benefits after age 30, they show
substantial differences according to sex and parental education level.

While

primary and high school educated women consider costs of children of age 11 to
20 and 21 to 30 about the same, college educated women consider children of
age 21 to 30 most costly.

This is suggestive of variations in expenditure

plan for children according to parental education level.

In particular, the

substantial difference in net costs at age 21 to 30 between boys and girls
among college education group might be suggesting the costs of college
education for boys. 19
Similarly, the costs of children of age 11 to 30 increase with parental
education level: the average cost of a son (daughter) is estimated as 11.9
(14.0), 30.8 (11.0), and 38.1 (29.2) for primary, high school, and college
education group. 20

This may reflect the differences in the opportunity cost

of a child in terms of wife's potential earning power or/and the differences
in expenditure (including investment) on children according to parent's
education level.
Finally, better educated women expect greater benefits from grown-up
sons (ages 31 or more) than less educated women do.

This difference appears

to reflect the differentia l earning power of children due to the different
In Korea, college enrollment rate among male has been much larger than
among female. For example, according to Unesco (1988) the college enrollment
rates were 23% and 39% among male in 1980 and 1984 respectivel y, while they were
8% and 19% among female. Also, Korean men usually have to serve for three years
in military during their late teens and early twenties. In those cases, the
college education is taken mostly during one's age of 20' s. In general in Korea,
the cost of college education is high and is financed by parents.
19

amounts are 13% (primary education group), 24% (high school), and
23% (college education group) of average household income during the first
period.
20 These

14

investment received while they were young.

The expected benefits from a son

of age 31 to 50 are 23.6, 34.8, and 67.0 among primary, high school, and
college educated women, respectively. 21

Contrasting to the substantial

benefits from grown-up sons, grown-up daughters yield insignificant benefits
to parents.

This might be reflecting the Korean custom that married daughters

are considered to be outside of the family.
Overall, the findings suggest that the old-age support from mature sons
is the important variable in identifying the differential parental fertility
behavior according to sex-age composition of children.
I tested whether the value of children is statistically different by
gender or age.

All the three tests (three education groups) reject at 1%

significance level the null hypothesis that the child costs are the same
between gender. 22

Also, all tests reject at 1% significance level the null

hypothesis that the child costs are the same over the four age groups. 23
4-1. Sensitivity of the Model to the Assumption of Old-Age Income
Since old-age security appears to play a major role in parents' fertility
decision-making, I test the sensitivity of the estimates by changing the
assumption on the old-age income level among the college-educated women (tests
on other education groups yield similar result).

In comparison to the

21 The

value of mature sons is about the same as the own old-age income for
primary or high school group, but a little higher for the college group.
22 Twice

the differences of the estimated likelihood with and without
restriction are 14.24, 13.70 and 26.20, respectively for primary, high school,
and college education group, and the critical value of Chi-square statistics is
13.28 at 4 degrees of freedom for 1% significance level.
23 Twice

the differences of the estimated likelihood with and without
restriction are 19.82, 18.44 and 24.48, respectively for primary, high school,
and college education group, and the critical value of Chi-square statistics is
16.82 at 6 degrees of freedom for 1% significance level.
15

benchmark case in which old age income is assumed as one-tenth of the peak
income, new estimates were made assuming the old-age income equal to one-half,
and one-fifth of the peak income.

The results are reported in Table 4.
(Table 4)

Since the estimation is based on the same fertility data, one expects
the estimated benefits from a grown-up child to increase as old age income
increases.

That is, to yield the same observed fertility pattern, the benefit

from a child during parent's old age should be larger, or/and the costs of
young children should be smaller when the parent's old age income is greater.
The empirical results support our conjecture.

The net positive value of very

young children (age Oto 10) and mature children (age 30 or higher) increases,
as the old-age income increases.
4-2. Predicted Fertility Profile

One way of testing maximum likelihood estimation results of a discrete choice
model is to compare the choices predicted by the estimates with those actually
made (Table 5, first panel).

The fertility rates in the first two periods are

predicted higher than the actual.

Given the slowly rising income schedule

with reduced income in old age, the optimal strategy is to have births early
(especially first two periods), and not to have in later periods.

The

prediction of higher fertility in early periods and lower fertility in later
periods than the actual is due to a rather uniform income profile and the
perfect fertility controi across individuals, both by assumption,

However,

the predicted pattern and the total rate of fertility match reasonably well
with the actual ones.
(Table 5)
4-3. Income Effect

16

Now, given the estimates of the value of children in Table 3, the effect of
the changes in old-age income on fertility can be predicted.

Increases in

old-age income from one-tenth to one-fifth and one-half of the peak income are
examined among college educated women (Table 5, second panel).

The fertility

rate in the first two periods does not change much when the old-age income
increases.

The effect appears most prominently in the decrease of fertility

rate in later periods.

As old-age income increases, parents are not so

desperate to have children to secure old age, even among those who have only
girls.

The expected fertility rate decreases from 2.56 to 2.06 and to 1.46,

as the old-age income increases to one-fifth and to one-half of the peak
income respectivel y.
4-4. Effect of the Changing Value of Children

Given that one of the main interests of the paper is to infer the type and
intensity of the parental sex preference due to the differentia l value of
children between boys and girls, it is interesting to predict the effect of
the changes in value of children on fertility.

Three different types of value

of children are used for the simulation (Table 5, third panel).
First, if daughters have the same value as estimated for sons from table
3, the optimal fertility rate might increase due to the rise in the marginal
value of children.

On the other hand, it may also decrease since any child

will provide support when parents are old, so that parents even with only
girls do not have to go on having children to provide themselves with security
in old age.

The overall effect on fertility rate is ambiguous.

The predicted

fertility rate is higher early in life cycle and lower later than in the
benchmark case.

However, the total fertility rate is about the same at 2.56.

In the opposite case (that is, sons have the same value as estimated for
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daughters), the fertility rate would be zero due to the negative values for
any child of any age.
Finally, if a child of either sex has the value profile which is the
average of the estimated value of boys and girls, the fertility rate increases
slightly, from 2.56 to 2.64.
children.

This is due to the small costs and benefits of

That is, as the benefits from mature children are small, parents

need many children to secure some old age consumption .

Moreover, the costs of

young children is small relative to income so that parents can afford to have
many children.

This might be interpreted as higher demand for less risky

investment.

s.

Selective Abortion, Fertility and sex Ratio

The modern technology which gives parents the ability to determine the gender
of a fetus has added a new dimension to the problem of fertility choice
(Bennett and Mason 1983; Bloom and Grenier 1983; Kobrin and Potter, Jr. 1983).
For parents who prefer to have children of one sex to the other, this ability
may lead to selective abortion.

An immediate consequence may be a change in

the sex ratio at birth, and eventually throughout the population if selective
abortion is practiced broadly over a prolonged period.
One notable case is in Korea.

According to the report of 1990 Korean

Vital Statistics, during the 1980s the male-female birth ratio in Korea has
increased dramaticall y, especially at high birth orders (Table 6).

For

example, in 1989, among the children born of the third or higher birth order,
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the male-female sex ratio approaches almost two 24 when it is normally less
than 1.1 males to 1.0 female.

The sex ratio might increase further in the

future if many parents want only one or two children, but of a specific sex.

(Table 6)
It is likely from the estimates in Table 3 that unless the costs of
screening test or abortion are high this sample of Korean women would have
only boys.

However, as shown in Table 6, the selective abortions are prac

ticed mostly at high birth orders.
of the first two children to chance.

In general, parents seem to leave the sex
Only those who were "unlucky" in their

first two births are practicing selective abortion.

This might be due to the

high costs of the screening test or abortion relative to incomes or only a
small gain from the selective abortion during the first couple of pregnancies.
A good prediction of the effect of the selective abortion through a screening
test will depend on the good measure of its costs, and of course on the
accurate measurement of the value of children.
Using the estimated values of children from Table 3, we can simulate the
effect of alternative test costs on conception, screening test, selective
abortion, and consequently on the sex ratio of children.

The estimated

proportion who choose to conceive, and, among those, who take the screening
test at each fertile period are presented in Table 7.

If the test cost is 50

(in 1000 won per month during the period), no conception is tested for its
gender during the first two periods.

But at the third and fourth period, 44%

or discriminatory child care which leads to differential
mortality rate between male and female children would also cause the biased sex
ratio. In the context of Korea these cases are believed to be trivial compared
See Hull (1989) and Johansson and Nygren
to the case of selective abortion.
(1991) for the discussions of Chinese case.
24 Infanticide
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and 88% of conceptions are tested.

As the price of the test decreases to 30,

3% of women take the test at the first period, while the percentage goes up to
about 88% at the second period and 100% at the third or later periods.

In

later periods, however, only few women choose to conceive.If the test costs
nothing, most of women who choose to conceive take the test at all periods.
The time pattern of using the test mostly depends on the costs of the
test relative to income, given the value of children.

If the cost of test is

high relative to income during the early periods, people are better off by
delaying the test to later periods when the income is high.
(Table 7)
The figures on the number of conceptions, number of live births, and the
sex ratio for alternative test costs are also computed (Table 7).

It is

assumed that the probability of any conception to be a boy is 0.515, that the
test is perfectly accurate, and that female fetuses, if tested, are aborted.
As the test cost becomes cheaper, the number of live birth decreases, while
the number of conceptions goes up. Consequently, the sex ratio among children
becomes larger with the decrease of the test cost.

The male-female birth

ratio rises to 2.91 from 1.33 as the test cost decreases from 50 to 30.
How realistic are these simulation results?

Using the data for Seoul

reported in Korean Vital Statistics (1982-1989) which provides number of
births by sex at each birth order, the proportions who took the screening test
during pregnancy are computed.

The sex ratio among the first births is used

as a natural sex ratio for any birth order, and it is assumed that female
fetuses are aborted if the test is taken. 25

Table 8 indicates that an in-

these assumptions the use of screening test is likely to be
underestimated due to several reasons. First, some parents might take test to
abort male fetuses. Second, it is not likely that all pregnancies which are
25Under
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creasing proportions are taking the screening test over time, first among high
birth orders, then gradually among lower birth orders.

During 1989, in Seoul,

5% of the second births, 46% of the third, 60% of the fourth, 44% of the
fifth, and 93% of the sixth births resorted to prenatal gender tests.

The

proportion of pregnant women who take the screening test (consequently the sex
ratio) is likely to go up further in the future, in particular among low birth
orders, if the desired number of children decreases while the parental son
preferences persist.
(Table 8)

6. Conclusions

This paper estimates the value of children by gender and age using a dynamic
programming model.

The underlying hypothesis is that the observed fertility

outcomes for any couple are the solutions to their life cycle optimization
problem.

The model is estimated using 1980 Korean Population Census.

The empirical findings in this research indicate that parental valuation
of children varies according to child's gender and age, and own education
levels.

Although at young ages boys impose relatively higher costs, they are

preferred to girls because of greater expected support in old age.

Further

more, the analysis suggests that the better educated women not only expect
higher cost of rearing young children but also anticipate higher benefits from
them when grown, than less educated women.

Overall, the old-age support from

mature sons appears to be the most important influencing factor in parental

tested to be of the unwanted sex are aborted.
abortions performed to the first births.
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Third, there might be selective

decisions on fertility choices.

Simulations show that, as income increases in

old age, parents would not be so desperate to have children, even among those
who have only girls.
As the estimation results suggest, the son preference in Korea is still
strong.

Therefore, selective abortions subsequent to fetal screening tests

which have become widely available in recent years bring in a new aspect to
the problem of fertility choices.

Simulations suggest that sex ratio would

increase further in future, if the costs of screening tests and abortion
decrease.

The dramatic increase of male-birth ratio in Korea during the late

1980's provides evidence of this development.
How will sex ratio change in future?

Will the perceived value of boys

relative to girls change as sex ratios change?

What will be the effects of

the changes in income, education, and other socio-economic aspects of the
environment on sex ratios?

How effective will be legal or institutional

regulations on prescreening test or gender selective abortions?
agenda for future research.

This is an

The fertility choice model should include the

availability of the selective abortion with an appropriate measure of price.
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Table la: Period Fertility Rate and Average Age

Perioda

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

(i) Primary or lower
Fertility

0.84

0.75

0.56

0.38

0.21

0.05

0.04

Avg. Ageb

24.5

26.5

28.5

30.5

32.4

34.4

36.3

179

179

179

179

170

135

75

NC

(ii) High school
Fertility

0. 78

0.81

0.54

0.36

0.12

0.08

0.05

Avg. Age

24.3

26.3

28.3

30.3

32.3

34.2

36.0

200

200

200

200

193

145

78

Fertility

0.82

0.81

0.60

0.21

0.11

0.02

0.03

Avg. Age

24.7

26.7

28.7

30.7

32.7

34.7

36.6

196

196

196

196

187

132

58

N

(iii) College

N

a. two year period since marriage.
b. at the start of the period.
C• the number of women.
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Table lb: Income Profile (monthly income in 1000 won)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Primary
(std. dev.)

95.95
36.16

104.68
39.87

115.41
43.96

127.24
48.46

140.28
53.43

154.66
58.90

170.51
64.94

High School
(std. dev.)

128.84
49.17

142.05
54.20

156.62
59.76

172.67
65.89

190.37
72.64

209.88
80.08

231.39
88.29

College
(std. dev)

166.16
44.54

183.19
49.10

201.97
54.14

222.67
59.69

245.50
65.80

270.66
72.55

298.40
79.99

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

Primary
(std. dev.)

187.99
71.60

207.25
78.94

228.50
87.03

251.92
95.95

217.62
82.89

187.99
71.60

162.39
61.85

High School
(std. dev.)

255.11
97.34

281.25
107.32

310.09
118.32

341.87
130.45

295.32
112.69

255.11
97.34

220.37
84.09

College
(std. dev)

328.99
88.18

362.71
97.22

399.89
107.18

440.88
118.17

380.84
102.08

328.99
88.18

284.19
76.18

15

16

17

18

19

20

21-25

Primary
(std. dev)

140.28
53.43

121.18
46.15

104.68
39.87

90.42
34.44

78.11
29.75

67.48
25.70

25.19
9.60

High School
(std. dev.)

190.37
72.64

164.45
62.75

142.05
54.20

122.71
46.82

106.00
40.45

91.57
34.94

34.19
13.04

College
(std. dev.)

245.50
65.80

212.07
56.84

183.19
49.10

158.25
42.42

136.70
36.64

118.09
31.65

44.09
11.82

Period

Period

Period

Note: Monthly income is computed by matching the husband's age and occupation
in Census to the average male income by age and occupation reported in
Monthly Wage Survey (1980, Korean Department of Labor).
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Table 2: Parity Progression Rate (%)
by Sex Composition

Number of boys among existing children

2

3

0

1

1 to 2+

96.4
(386)

94.1
(506)

2 to 3+

87.7
(179)

55.1
(439)

43.9
(230)

3 to 4+

54.4
(79)

31. 2
(176)

7.8
(204)

22.0
(41)

4 to 5+

40.0
(25)

9.3
(43)

0.0
(39)

(11)

Progression

Note: Sample sizes in parentheses.
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9.1

4

20.0
(5)

Table 3: Estimated Monthly Net Value of Boys and Girls
(in 1000 won)

Woman's com2leted education level
Primary

High School

College

-0.27 ( 0.01)

2.91 ( 1. 64)

10.48 ( 5.76)

Age 11-20

-13.02 ( 5.67)

-25.50 (24.04)

-13 .09 ( 5.10)

Age 21-30

-10.72 ( 7.06)

-36.18 (24.59)

-63.02 (25.78)

Age 31-50

23.57 ( 6.49)

34.79 (21.43)

67.04 (27.78)

Age 0-10

-0.26 ( 0.25)

8.66 ( 1.14)

10.82 ( 5.86)

Age 11-20

-13. 59 ( 2. 67)

-12.96 ( 8.60)

-26.99 (19.95)

Age 21-30

-14.40 ( 5.38)

-9.00 ( 8.90)

-31. 33 (13.31)

Age 31-50

-0.07 ( 0.19)

12.31 ( 2.76)

3.13 ( 1.59)

-708.08

-763.52

-684.54

1096

1198

1161

Parameter
Bo:£' s net value b:£ age
Age 0-10

Girl's net value b:£ age

Log-Likelihood
Total fertile
periods observed

Note: Unsigned asymptotic t-statistics are in parentheses.
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Table 4: Sensitivity of the Estimates to Changes in
the Assumption on Old-Age Income
(College Educated Women)
Old-age income as a ratio to peak income
One-half

One-fifth

One-tenth

Age 0-10

26.60 ( 0.01)

16.80 ( 3.21)

10.48 ( 5.76)

Age 11-20

-32.93 ( 5.67)

-17.01 ( 7.20)

-13.09 ( 5.10)

Age 21-30

-72.30 ( 7.06)

-63.43 (35.35)

-63.02 (25.78)

Age 31-50

99.79 ( 6.49)

70.44 (17.22)

67.04 (27.78)

Age 0-10

32.32 ( 0.25)

17.82 ( 3.65)

10.82 ( 5.86)

Age 11-20

-26.10 ( 2.67)

-26.64 (10.82)

-26.99 (19.95)

Age 21-30

-14.98 ( 5.58)

-27.79 (17.65)

-31. 33 (13. 31)

Age 31-50

12.60 ( 0.19)

2.43 ( 2.50)

3.13 ( 1.59)

-700.99

-691.33

-684.54

Parameter
Boy's net value by age

Girl's net value by age

Log-Likelihood

Note: Unsigned asymptotic t-statistics are in parentheses.
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Table 5: Predicted Fertility Rate
(College Educated Women)
Period

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Total

Actual

0.82

0.81

0.60

0.21

0.11

0.02

0.03

2.60

Predicted

1.00

0.86

0.42

0.17

0.09

0.02

0.00

2.56

Income effect
One-fiftha

1.00

0. 72

0.30

0.04

0.00

0.00

0.00

2.06

One-halfb

0.98

0.47

0.01

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.46

Effect of changes in value of children
Equal 0

0.00

0.93

0.41

0.13

0.05

0.04

0.00

2.56

Averaged

1.00

0.95

0.53

0.15

0.05

0.01

0.00

2.64

196

196

196

196

187

132

58

N

a. Old-age income increases to one-fifth of the peak income.
b. Old-age income increases to one-half of the peak income.
C •
Value of girls is set as the same as the estimated value of boys.
d. Value of a child of either sex is set as the average of the estimated value
of boys and girls.
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Table 6: Male-Female Birth Ratios by Birth Order in Korea
Birth order
Year

Total

1

2

3

4

5+

1989

1.13
(613240)

1.05
(328044)

1.14
(241249)

1. 90
(34794)

2.17
(6551)

2.14
(2605)

1988

1.14
(620316)

1.08
(335449)

1.14
(238279)

1. 70
(35880)

1. 99
(7402)

1. 87
(3306)

1987

1.09
(613556)

1.05
(333111)

1.09
(230097)

1. 37
(37523)

1.50
(8474)

1. 63
(4351)

1986

1.13
(613703)

1.08
(325517)

1.12
(229794)

1.43
(42294)

1. 61
(10406)

1. 61
(5685)

1985

1.10
(636621)

1.06
(328212)

1.08
(241201)

1.33
(47228)

1. 57
(12778)

(7191)

1984

1.09
(660234)

1.07
(326720)

1.08
(250939)

1.19
(55585)

1. 32
(17188)

1. 34
(9793)

1983

1.08
(757930)

1.06
(339091)

1.06
(291298)

1.13
(84508)

1. 21
(27225)

1.28
(15801)

1982

1.07
(840279)

1.06
(351335)

1.06
(299408)

1.10
(124383)

1.13
(40708)

1.18
(24442)

1981

1.07
(864958)

1.06
(354298)

1.07
(290228)

1.07
(142096)

1.13
(47913)

1.15
(30347)

1980

1.04
(888355)

1.06
(351213)

1.04
(278814)

1.03
(149015)

1.02
(59370)

0.96
(49859)

Note: Number of births are in parentheses.
Data: Annual report on the Vital Statistics (1990), National Bureau of
Statistics, Economic Planning Board of Korea.
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1. 54

Table 7: Predicted Proportion of Conception (D) and Screening Test (H)
with Various Costs of Screening Test
(College Educated Women)
Period

Cost of
screening
test

1

2

3

4

5a

D

1.00

0.94

0. 72

0.44

0.30

H

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

D

1.00

0.89

0.53

0.25

0.16

H

0.03

0.88

1.00

1.00

1.00

D

1.00

0.86

0.45

0.21

0.13

H

0.00

0.16

0.90

1.00

1.00

D

1.00

0.86

0.42

0.18

0.12

H

0.00

0.00

0.44

0.88

1.00

TC=0

TC-30

TC=40

TC=50
TC
Preg
CEB
S.R.
D
H

a

Preg.

CEB

S.R.

3.56

1. 83

inf.

2.92

2.02

2.91

2.74

2.27

1. 64

2.65

2.39

1. 33

monthly cost during the period (24 months) when the screening test is
taken.
average number of pregnancy.
children ever born.
male-female chid ratio among children born.
the proportion who choose to conceive.
the proportion, among those who choose to conceive, who choose to take
the test.
there are very few who choose to conceive at periods 6 and 7.
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Table 8: Estimated Ratio(%) of Screening Test by Birth Order
Calculated Using Data from Vital Statistics
SEOUL
Birth order
Year

Total

1

2

3

4

5

6

1989

4.61

0.00
(91633)

4.60
(61507)

46.5
(6414)

60.2
(814)

44.1
(156)

92.7
(31)

1988

3.75

0.00
(92979)

3.90
(59899)

38.4
(6272)

59.5
(827)

49.0
(161)

40.6
(42)

1987

2.47

0.00
(90229)

2.70
(55352)

23.9
(6092)

44.4
(922)

30.8
(209)

29.0
(57)

1986

2.64

0.00
(90829)

1.50
(56240)

29.2
(6979)

45.6
(1287)

43.4
(288)

25.6
(76)

1985

2.04

0.00
(91807)

0.80
(59799)

21. 7
(8037)

35.1
(1514)

32.0
(336)

51. 8
(127)

1984

2.07

0.00
(89698)

1.40
(62492)

14.3
(9390)

30.9
(2105)

41.2
(493)

35.4
(161)

1983

2.13

0.00
(89775)

1.00
(73680)

11. 9
(15029)

23.1
(3231)

31. 6
(689)

20.8
(286)

1982

1. 80

0.00
(92204)

0.00
(76850)

8.90
(22078)

18.8
(4797)

24.7
(1326)

31. 9
(394)

Note: Number of births are in parentheses.
Data: Annual report on the Vital Statistics (1990), National Bureau of
Statistics, Economic Planning Board of Korea.
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